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HUGO BLACK'S CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION OF LOBBYING AND THE
PUBLIC UTILITIES HOLDING COMPANY ACT:
A HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE POWER TRUST,
NEW DEAL POLITICS, AND REGULATORY
PROPAGANDA
WILLIAM A. GmREoRy* and RENNARD STRICKLAND**
A lobbyist is anyone who opposes legislation I want. A patriot
is anyone who supports me.-Senator James A. Reed of Missouri'
We are all ready to be savage in some cause. The difference be-
tween a good man and a bad man is the choice of the cause.
-William JameS2
Justice Hugo Black believed, and evangelically so, that there are
themes or conflicts that recur again and again throughout human history.
"He saw," as Professor Meador notes, "common threads in the actions and
attitudes of people from the Greeks of Thucydides through Jesus Christ,
the Romans of Livy and Tacitus, England of the seventeenth century, the
American struggle for independence and union, to the latest hour in the
twentieth century."3
Among the themes of both human history and personal life which
haunted Black were the questions of the abuse of economic power, the
limits of political influence, and the role of investigation-especially the
role, in the contemporary setting, of the Special Legislative Investigation
Committee. A passage heavily marked in Black's copy of Joseph Frank's
The Levellers reflects both the historical nature and the contemporary
character of these concerns.4
* B.A., Case Western Reserve University; M.A., University of Michigan; J.D., Harvard
University. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Tulsa.- Ed.
** B.A., Northeastern State University; J.D., University of Virginia; MA., University
of Arkansas; S.J.D., University of Virginia. Associate Professor of Law, University of Washing-
ton.-Ed.
1 K. ScMTssI.SSER, TnE LOBBYISTS unnumbered front matter page (1951).
2Id.
3 D. MEADOR, MR. JUSTICE AND HIS Boos 31 (1974) [hereinafter cited as MEAnOR].
4 Id. at 21-22. See generally Hudon, John L. Lilburne, The Levellers, and Mr. Justice
Black, 60 A.BA.J. 686 (1974).
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
The Levellers of seventeenth century England faced, and faced up to,
many of the social problems which are today plaguing the Western World.
Such current issues in the United States as the propriety of loyalty oaths or
the need to limit the scope of legislative investigating committees were issues
which three hundred years ago helped determine the aims and techniques
of the Leveller party. Indeed, the words of the chief Leveller spokesmen
are often echoed with startling accuracy on the more progressive editorial
pages of the 1950s.5
Black's continuing interest is understandable for the Legislative In-
vestigation Committee was intimately connected with the Senate years of
Black's life.' As John P. Frank notes in his biography, Mr. Justice Black,
"[I] t was as an investigator that Black performed his greatest service to
the New Deal." 7 Unquestionably, among the many factors in Roosevelt's
nomination of Black to serve as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court,
was the bulldog tenacity with which the Senator pushed New Deal pro-
posals with his investigative skills and with his special congressional com-
mittees.8
After Black was on the Court, investigations continued to interest him
as shown by the large number of books on the topic which he kept in his
home library.' And the interest was not purely academic, for he faced the
5 J. FRANK, TnE LEVELLERS: A HISTORY OF THE WmTNos OF THREE SEVENTEENT=-
CFNrruRY SocL4L DEMocRATs 1 (1955).
6 V. HAI, TON, HUGO Bi.AcK: TE Ar.ABAMA YrRAs 214-59 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as M olON].
7 J. FRANK, MR. JUsTICE BrACK: THE MAN AND His OPNIONS 63 (1949) [hereinafter
cited as FRANK].
8 W. Leuchtenberg, Klansman Joins the Court: The Appointment of Hugo L. Black,
41 U. Cr. L. Rv. 1-31 (1973), is the most complete, objective discussion of the Black appoint-
ment based upon primary material and oral history sources. Among other political questions
which weighed in the nomination was a felt need to nominate a member of the Senate so that
confirmation would be an easier task. Roosevelt had just been defeated on his Court reform (or
Court packing) plans. Geographic considerations were also important in the case of Black
because a southerner would help "balance" the Court. As Mr. Justice Black's biographer and
former clerk, John P. Frank, has noted, "Black was appointed first and foremost to be a New
Dealer on the Court." Frank, Justice Black and the New Deal, 9 ARIE. L. REv. 26 (1967).
However, the story of Black's years on the Court reveals that he was never a total Rooseveltian.
A New Dealer, yes. A doctrinaire New Dealer, no 1
9 MEADOR, supra note 3, at 50, 56, 65, 66, 70, 87, 91, 120, 124, 141, 148, 154. These included
the following books: E. BAsu'rr, THE TEmmEy CoxrirrE: LEoISLATIVE INVESTIGATION or
SUBVERSIVE Acnvrms 3N CAm 0RNiA (1951); A. BARTH, GOVERNMNT BY INVESTIGATION
(1955); E. BoNTzcou, THE FEDERAL LOYALTY SECURr PROOAM (1953); R. CAR, THE
HOUSE CoMMITTEE ON UN-AMERCAN AcTIVITIES (1952); L. CHAMBERLAIN, LOYALTY AND
LEGIsrATvE ACnON (1951); V. COUNTRYMAN, UN-AMERICAN Acrrrns iN "rna STATE. or
WASHINGTON: THE WORK: OF T CANWELL CommrIrn= (1951); W. GFLLHORN, SECURITY,
LOYALTY, AND SCIENCE (1952); W. HAmHTON, THE PoLuncs OF INDUSTRY (1957); D. MoR-
GAN, CONGRESS AND THE CoNsTrrurioN: A STUDY or RESPONSIBrITY (1966); A. OGDEN, THE
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congressional investigation issue squarely in a number of cases such as
Barenblatt v. United States,0 in which he dissented from the affirmance
of a conviction for refusing to answer questions before the House Un-
American Activities Committee. As late as 1968 Justice Black returned
to the subject of the powers of congressional investigating committees in
A Constitutional Faith, the James S. Carpentier Lectures at the Columbia
University School of Law."
Because the fascinating legal career of Hugo Black culminated in his
many years of service on the Supreme Court and because this tenure was
so long and productive, these later Court years tend to obscure an earlier
career which, standing alone, would be regarded as a substantial achieve-
ment for any man. Both Black's personal life and career have been ably
recounted by friends and scholars, although with a greater emphasis on
his Supreme Court experience.' Recent sources have indicated the long-
DIEs CoaxrrEa: A STUDY OF Tm SPEcIL HOUSE Comm==TTEE FOR Tm INvsTIGATiON OF
UN-AmIEmcAN Acrvls, 1938-1944 (1945) ; G. STEWART, ThE YEAR oF THE OAT: TEE FIGHT
FOR ACADEMIC FREEDM AT Tm UN IVERSIT oF CALIFoRA (1950) ; and N. WEVE, TiE BATTLE
AGAINST DisLoYATY (1951). Black's personal library included few governmental documents
but he did have in his home three reports of investigations. Two of these were loyalty investiga-
tions of the 1950's and one was his own mail contract investigation. U.S. CONGRESS. SENATE
COiMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INvESTIGATION
AND PART 2, INDIVmuAL ViEws or SENATOR LODGE. S. REP. No. 2108, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1950) ; State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation: Hearings Before a Subcommittee.
U.S. Senate, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), pursuant to S. Res. 231. Pt. 3, June 28, 1950; U.S.
CONGREss. SPECIAL SENATE COMMITTEE ON INvESTIGATION or AIR MAIL CONTRACTS. Hearings,
73d Cong., pursuant to S. Res. 349, 72d Cong. Part 4, Jan. 9 to Jan. 18, 1934.
10 360 U.S. 109 (1959). See also W. MENDELSON, JUSTICE BLACK AND FAxFrUin :
CoN _rcr n ma COURT 51-55 (1961) for a discussion of freedom of expression and association
as related to Communist investigations.
11 H. BLACK, A CONSTrruTioNAL FArTr 49-52 (1969).
12 One is reminded of Felix Frankfurter's comments in his Holmes study that "a lawyer's
life before he becomes a judge, like that of an actor, is largely writ in water unless he had
a rich political career." F. FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND TE SUPREME COURT 13
(1938). The Black books include the following: H. DAVIs, UNCLE HUGO: AN INTIMATE PoR-
TRAIT OF MR. JUSTICE BLAcK: (1965); I. DILLARD (ed.), OuN MAN'S STAND FOR FREEDOM: MR.
JUSTICE BLACK AND ma BILL OF RIGHTS (1963) ; J. FRANK, ESSAYS ON JUSTICE HUGO BLACK,
JUSTICE WmLIwAx 0. DouLAs, JUSTICE FRANK MUPv (1970); FRANK, supra note 7; S.
STRICKLA (ed.), HuGo BLACK AND m SUwPRME COURT: A SYmPoSrum (1967); C. Wn-
LrAms, HuGo L. BLACK: A STUDY IN ma JUrDICIA PRocEss (1950) [hereinafter cited as Wi.-
LIAMS]. The law review articles seem almost without end and cover practically every aspect of
the public career and of the public man. The range of topics is illustrated by the following
articles: Armstrong, Mr. Justice Black, 20 TENN. L. REv. 638 (1949); Ash, Growth of Justice
Black's Philosophy on Freedom of Speech: 1962-1966, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 840 (1967) ; Barnett,
Mr. Justice Black and the Supreme Court, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 20 (1940) ; Berman, Hugo L.
Black: The Early Years, 8 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 103 (1959) ; Berman, The Racial Issue and Mr.
Justice Black, 16 Am. U.L. REv. 386 (1967); Cooper, Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black: Free Man,
17 ALA. L. REv. 195 (1965) ; Decker, Justice Hugo L. Black: The Balancer of Absolutes, 59 CAL.
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term nature and breadth of his intellectual interests and of the special
southern influence of the so-called "Alabama years."'"
The present study deals with the Senate years and Black's investiga-
tion of lobbying activities against the Public Utilities Holding Company
Act, known as the Wheeler-Rayburn Bill.'4 The Black investigation is an
interesting study in the enactment of legislation and of the New Deal effort
to reform rather than replace existing economic policies. The Public Utility
Holding Company Bill is an appropriate vehicle for study because after it
was ultimately adopted in 1935, the Act proved to be extraordinarily effec-
tive in ending the abuses of the holding company, while at the same time
preserving the existing benefits of the holding company system."
L. REv. 1335 (1971); Donnici, Protector of the Minorities: Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black, 32
U.M.K.C.L. Rxv. 266 (1964); Dunne, Justice Hugo Black and the Brown Decision: A
Speculative Inquiry, 39 Mo. L. REv. 1-26 (1974) ; Green, Mr. Justice Black versus the Supreme
Court, 4 U. NEwA.x L. REv. 113-48 (1939); Harlan, Mr. Justice Black-Remarks of a Col-
league, 81 HAiv. L. REv. 1 (1967); Klein, Mr. Justice Black: A Judicial View of American
Constitutional Democracy, 22 Mifrs L. REv. 753 (1968); Krislov, Mr. Justice Black Reopens
the Free Speech Debates, 11 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv. 189 (1964); Meador, Justice Black and His Law
Clerks, 15 ALA. L. REv. 57 (1962); Mr. Justice Black: A Symposium, 65 YALE: L.J. 449 (1956)
with contributions by Douglas, Rostow, Frank, Cahn, Green, Paul; Reich, Mr. Justice Black
and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REv. 673 (1963); Resnik, Black, Douglas, and
Absolutes: Some Suggestions for a New Perspective on the Supreme Court, 47 J. URBAN L.
765 (1970) ; Snowiss, Legacy of Justice Black, 1973 Sup. CT. REv. 187-252 (1973) ; Strickland,
Mr. Justice Black: A Reappraisal, 25 FED. B.J. 365 (1965); Symposium, Mr. Justice Black:
Thirty Years in Retrospective, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 397 (1967), with contributions by Warren,
Johnson, Kalven, Rice, Freund, Kilpatrick, Rutledge, Wright, and Sutherland; Symposium,
Sprig of Laurel for Hugo Black, 10 Am. U.L. REv. 75 (1961), with essays by Rodell, Dillard,
Burr, and Berman; Ulmer, Longitudinal Behavior of Hugo LaFayette Black: Parabolic Support
for Civil Liberties, 1937-71, 1 FLA. ST. L. REV. 131-53 (1973); Yarbraugh, Justice Black and
His Critics on Speech-Plus and Symbolic Speech, 52 TaX. L. Rv. 257-84 (1974); Yarbrough,
Mr. Justice Black and His Legal Positivism, 57 VA. L. Rv. 375 (1971); Yarbrough, Justices
Black and Douglas: The Judicial Function and Scope of Constitutional Liberties, 1973 DUKE
L. J. 441 (1973).
13 MEADOR, supra note 3 and IarrLTosr, supra note 6. For a picture of Black's continuing
relationship with "his South," see Black, There Is a South of Union and Freedom, 2 GA. L.
REv. 10 (1967). Earlier, one might note Black, Reminiscences, 18 ALA. L. REv. 3 (1965). Fol-
lowing Justice Black's death, there were the appreciations and the memorials, many touching
tributes often bringing warm personal insights to the story. Goldberg, Address, 24 ALA. L. REv.
255 (1972); Wright, Hugo Black: A Great Man and A Great American, 50 TEx. L. REv. 1
(1971); Durr, Hugo L. Black: A Personal Appraisal, 6 GA. L. REv. 1 (1971); Frank, Hugo
L. Black: He Has Joined the Giants, 58 A.B.A.J. 21 (1972); Kurland, Hugo LaFayette Black:
In Memorium, 20 J. PUB. L. 359 (1971) ; Keeffee, Justice Black Leaves His Mark, 58 A.B.A.J.
63 (1972) ; Dorsen, Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Harlan, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 649 (1971) ;
Hugo Black Memorial Issue, 24 ALA. L. REv. 1-44 (1971), with remarks by Cooper, Hobbs,
Haigh; Cooper, Mr. Justice Hugo LaFayette Black of Alabama (1886-1971), 33 ALA. LAWYER
17 (1972).
14 14 U.S.C. §§ 79-79(2)-6 (1935) as amended; Act of Aug. 26, 1935, 49 Stat. 803 (1935).
15 1 L. Loss, SEcuRITYr REGULATION 135 (2d ed. 1961). The corporate simplification man-
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Furthermore, the life cycle of the Black Committee serves as a stan-
dard to judge the recent past. Economic influence peddling is one of the
recurring themes of human history. Black understood that "in the lives
of men over a two thousand year spread of time and place" there would be
"repeated patterns of behavior-moments of glory and high purpose, acts
of skulduggery, displays of the strengths and weaknesses of character,
persecutors of the weak by the powerful, triumph and disaster, corruption
in public office, and struggles for liberty against arbitrary officialdom.""
Watergate was not the first example of the bringing to light of massive
contributions by interests to influence political decisions. In a very real
sense, the Associated Milk Producers, I. T. & T., and selected oil com-
panies are the direct lineal descendants of the Committee of Public Utility
Executives, Associated Gas and Electric Company (hereafter A. G. & E.),
and the selected power companies investigated by Black. Presidents Eisen-
hower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon purportedly mirrored Roosevelt's
use of federal tax returns in investigating domestic questions and political
opponents. And in the midst of power trusts, New Deal politics, and regu-
latory propaganda, Senator Hugo Black of Alabama conducted what one
friendly biographer called "Chairman Black's Three-Ring Circus."'17
Black's committee was authorized by a Senate Resolution of July 2,
1935, and began work immediately in preparation for public hearings."8
The first were hastily commenced on July 12 and soon became a key instru-
ment of congressional activity in support of the Wheeler-Rayburn Bill.
This first phase of the Black investigation ended in late August with
the adjournment of Congress and the passage of the Wheeler-Rayburn
Bill. Nonetheless, because of the breadth of powers granted to Black's
committee, hearings resumed in March of 1936 in the early days of the
second session of the 74th Congress. 9 After having exposed the machina-
tions of the power trust, Black turned to a more general investigation of all
dated by Section 11 of the Act has now been largely accomplished. By June 30, 1967, the
holding companies registered under the Act had been reduced from 216 to 27. 4 L. Loss, at 2276
(1969). A substantial amount of case law has been required to interpret the Act, especially
Section 11. These are gathered in 1 L. Loss 135-41 and updated at 4 L. Loss 2276-78. Informa-
tion on construction of Section 11(b) (1) dealing with limitations on operations of holding
company systems may be found at 16 L.Ed.2d 1218 (1967). For a case reflecting the modern
restrictions on acquisition of nonutility interests, see Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. v. S.E.C.,
444 F.2d 913 (1971).
16 MADOR, supra note 3, at 31.
17 HAmLro., supra note 6, at 234-59.
18Hugo L. Black, Chairman (Dem., Ala.); Sherman Minton (Dem., Ind.); Lewis B.
Schwellenbach (Dem., Wash).; Lynn J. Frazier (Rep., N.D.); Ernest W. Gibson (Rep., Vt.).
19 Hearings before a Special Comm. to Investigate Lobbying Activities, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess., at 1 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Hearings, Black Committee].
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forms of lobbying, concentrating mainly on the newly formed anti-New
Deal groups, such as the Liberty League, Sentinels of the Republic, and
the Farmers Independence Council. While this later phase of the investi-
gation bears only a secondary relation to the politics of the Utilities Bill,
it is related to the first phase of the investigation in method and purpose.
Moreover, it is necessary to explore both phases of Black's investigation
in order to appreciate the full opposition, which did not develop until the
beginning of the second phase.
When Franklin Roosevelt introduced the Public Utilities Holding
Company Bill, he implicitly endorsed a particular brand of political phi-
losophy encompassing an expanded program of federal economic control.
That philosophy, stemming from the Wilsonian doctrine of the New Free-
dom, had its roots in the Progressive era, and now, interpreted by men such
as Felix Frankfurter and Louis Brandeis, came to play an increasingly
important role in the New Deal." The thrust of this phase is exemplified by
Frankfurter's attitude, illustrated in an anecdote of fairly wide circulation
in New Deal Washington.
Thomas Reed Powell, a colleague [of Frankfurter] at the Harvard
Law School found himself one evening in the company of eminent legal and
financial magnates who dominated the conversation by complaining about
Frankfurter's alleged radicalism. Powell listened quietly for a while, but
finally his patience gave way. "Felix a radical?" he protested. "Helli I The
damn fool is wearing out his heart trying to make capitalism live up to its
pretensions."''s
Many leading scholars of this period have seen the ascendancy of this
philosophy as significant enough to mark off the beginning of a new phase
of the New Deal, sometimes called the Second New Deal, in which the
Roosevelt Administration placed greater emphasis on fundamental reform
than immediate recovery from the economic effects of the Great Depres-
sion. Today, we know that this phase was the most permanent in reshaping
the American nation and in restructuring the American economy.
The Brandeisians diagnosed the ills of the country as the effect of
monopolistic concentration of industry. They advocated federal action to
break up corporations into sufficiently small units. They believed that the
restoration of free competition would effectively cure the country's eco-
nomic ills which, in their analysis, resulted largely from the corrupt, para-
20 Hawley, "The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly 1934-38" (unpublished doc-
toral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1958), Microfilm 3786, at 663 [hereinafter Hawley);
W. LEUCTExmERG, FPANK~m D. ROOSEVELT AND T=E NEW DEAL 157 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as LEUCENBERG].
21 M. PARISH, SECURITIS REGULATION AND TEi N-w DEAL 1-2 (1970).
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sitic inefficiency of the corporate structure. Any abuses which free
competition could not handle, the Brandeisians would leave to the states,
having enabled them to regulate effectively by cutting the corporate mon-
sters down to size. The rationale behind this New Deal approach was a fear
of the political and economic effects of concentrated wealth. President
Roosevelt expressed this point of view when he stated:
It is idle to talk of the continuation of holding companies on the assumption
that regulation can protect the public against them. Regulation has small
chance of ultimate success against the kind of concentrated wealth and
economic power which holding companies have shown the ability to acquire
in the utility field... 22
An exhaustive study of the utilities industry undertaken by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission established that this was no mere theoretical ab-
straction 3 The private utilities industry, once it had acquired economic
predominance over municipally or other publicly owned utilities, proceeded
to use that economic power to buttress its political position.
The primary weapon of the public utilities was a vast propaganda
campaign begun in 1919. The Federal Trade Commission study concluded
that "measured by quantity, extent, and cost, this was probably the great-
est peace-time propaganda campaign ever conducted by private interests in
this country."24 Although not limited to influencing the press and the
schools, the campaign of the utilities was concentrated in these two areas.
The propagandists recognized the importance of these institutions in the
formation of public opinion. In the schools the utilities put their message
across by employing teachers for the summer, by inviting teachers to help
plan courses in utility studies, by making direct money payments to lead-
ing universities, and by applying pressure on the textbook publishers.25
The press easily yielded, especially when induced by large advertising
expenditures. The utilities supplemented this indirect influence by purchas-
ing a controlling interest in a number of newspapers.26
Considering this history of, depending upon your viewpoint, "public
education" or "propaganda," the magnitude of the public outcry against
the Wheeler-Rayburn Bill is no surprise. The storm of protest was as much
a result of the carefully prepared long-range propaganda campaign as of
an immediate response to the intense lobbying efforts by the opponents of
22 Hawley, supra note 20, at 661.
2 3 S' smpy REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION TO THE SENATE OF THE UNMIED
STATES ox" EFFORTS BY AssociATIoNs AND AGENCIES OF ELECTRIC AND GAS UTmXS TO IN-
FLuENcE PuBmuc Opn IoN, S. Doc. 92, part 71a (1934).
2 4 Id. at 391.
25 Id.
2 6 Id. at 392.
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the legislation.2" Nonetheless, this specific lobbying campaign against the
Wheeler-Rayburn Bill is a striking example of the degree of political
manipulation available to the holders of concentrated economic power.
The heart of the Wheeler-Rayburn Bill was the so-called "death sen-
tence clause" which provided for the abolition of holding companies unless
they could justify their existence to the satisfaction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Passing the Senate by a margin of only one vote,
the death sentence clause then failed to pass the scrutiny of the House.
Roosevelt felt the bill was emasculated without this section.
Vice President James N. Garner, in an attempt to strengthen the
Administration's position, ignored the traditional seniority procedures and
appointed five senators to the conference committee, four of whom had
voted for the death sentence clause.28 The Administration felt that the
defeat in the House did not indicate insurmountable opposition because
the prodigious lobbying efforts of the utility companies might explain the
defeat.
Prominent among the organizations working for the defeat of the bill
were the Committee of Utility Company Executives, under the super-
vision of Philip Gadsden, and the American Federation of Utility In-
vestors, led by Dr. Hugh Magill. These two groups, in conjunction with
several others, as well as the more localized efforts of the various operating
companies, had mounted an extensive campaign against the Wheeler-Ray-
burn Bill. The Western Union office at Washington, D.C. later estimated
that in the days preceding the vote on the death sentence clause House
members received more than 97,000 telegrams.29
Letters, telegrams, and personal visits from influential citizens of
their home districts assured politically aware congressmen that the
Wheeler-Rayburn Bill was unpopular "back home." Ostensibly, an au-
thentic grass-roots movement had developed. New Deal leaders felt the
only means to combat the utility lobby was to expose its methods to public
view and thereby discredit the claim of popular support. In his column of
July 12, Arthur Krock correctly analyzed the Administration strategy. 0
Only one thing ... can produce a law with the Senate's narrowly imposed
"death sentence", and that is largely in the hands of the investigating com-
mittees of the Senate and House. If scandals can be laid to the utility
2 7 REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMIMSION TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
PuBLIcrTy AND PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES BY UTITs GROUPS AND CoPANIES, S. Doc. 92, part
81a, at 1 (1936).
28 N.Y. Times, July 11, 1935, at 4.
2 Id., July 19, 1935, at 8.
SOHawley, supra note 20, at 666; 6 NEWSWEEK, July 20, 1935, at 7-8.
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lobbyists the House will stampede for cover, and its conferees will quickly
reflect the change.31
Thus Roosevelt's hopes for the Public Utilities Holding Act rested
on Hugo Black of Alabama. Black was an ideal choice to head a committee
to expose utility lobbyists. His prior experience in investigation of air mail
and shipping subsidies established his reputation as a first-rate, tenacious
prober. Black gained his initial exposure to the work of a congressional
investigation committee in 1929 when Senator Thaddeus H. Caraway in-
vited him to become "guest assistant" on the Caraway subcommittee
established to investigate lobbying.3 2 The Caraway experience was instru-
mental in forming Black's views of the duties of a congressional lobbying
investigation. The resolution authorizing the Caraway investigation con-
tains these words: "... Whereas the lobbyists seek by all means to capi-
talize for themselves every interest and every sentiment of the American
public which can be made to yield an unclean dollar for their greedy
pockets....,3 Compare this with Black's statement that follows: "There
is no constitutional right to lobby. There is no right on the part of any
greedy or predatory interest to use money taken from the pockets of the
citizen to mislead him .... W4
Black's view of the power lobby, although severe, was essentially
accurate. Lobbying by the utility interests differed in both substance and
procedure from the citizen's right to petition his government for redress
of grievances. Fraud, deception, and the illicit exertion of monopolistically
acquired economic power, Black believed, go far beyond any legitimate
right of petition. Not only did Black staunchly oppose the lobby interests,
he also refused to permit them to ignore Congress' investigatory power.
For example, in February of 1934 the Senate voted contempt citations
against two airline officials who had obstructed Black's investigation by
destroying papers that Black had subpoenaed.35 Both men later served ten
days in jail in the District of Columbia. The Supreme Court sustained
the legality of the Senate's action in the case of Jurney v. McCracken,"
thereby reinforcing congressional authority to compel testimony from re-
luctant witnesses.
The Black Committee did not have an exclusive or completely free
31 N.Y. Times, July 12, 1935, at 18.
3 2 Black: A Man of Parts: Senator, Investigator, and Individual, 6 N~wswBx, Mar. 14,
1935, at 21.
33 Senate Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary (1929-30) (Thad-
deus H. Caraway, Dem., Ark., chairman).
3 4 Hearings, Black Committee, supra note 19.
81 WnmLuAs, supra note 12, at 193.
30 Jurney v. McCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935).
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field in which to conduct its investigation. At the same time that the Black
Committee was meeting, the House Rules Committee (John J. O'Connor,
chairman), was also authorized to investigate attempts to influence voting
on the Wheeler-Rayburn Bill. Hearings were held simultaneously. Some
House leaders viewed Black's investigation as simply a device to make
headlines. Others, such as Representative Rankin of Mississippi, recog-
nized O'Connor's desultory approach to the problem and viewed Black's
work as absolutely essential.
Speaker Byrnes wanted either to consolidate the two investigations
or to persuade O'Connor to leave the investigation solely to the Senate
Committee. However, he did not succeed in this effort to head off conflict."'
Before the twentieth of July, Black's vigorous conduct of the investi-
gation had yielded several startling headlines. This elicited O'Connor's
remark that all the Senate Committee had done so far was to "rush in and
beat us to it .... I don't think they have touched on much yet."88 O'Con-
nor's dilatory policy became explicable when later testimony before the
Black Committee brought out that Basil O'Connor, former law partner
of President Roosevelt and a brother of Representative John J. O'Connor,
received $25,000 in legal fees from the utilities during the preceding year.",
Chairman O'Connor revealed his hand almost from the beginning.4"
He ignored the lobbying efforts of the utilities and instead focused his
attention on the Administration's lobbying activities. The most damaging
accusation was Representative Brewster's account of a conversation with
Thomas Corcoran, legislative troubleshooter for President Roosevelt." At
this point in the testimony Brewster interjected, "You are a liar."' ' Un-
fortunately for Brewster's reputation, Ernest Gruening, a former Maine
newspaper editor, now working for the Department of the Interior, who
had been present at the Brewster-Corcoran encounter, substantiated Cor-
coran's version of the affair.43 Nonetheless, the publicity O'Connor's in-
vestigation gave to the charges of Administration lobbying could only hurt
the chances for eventual passage of the Wheeler-Rayburn Bill.
During these preliminary skirmishes with O'Connor, the conference
committee's deliberations had ground to a halt. On August 1 the New York
3 7 N.Y. Times, July 13,1935, at 1; Id., July 14, at 18.
38 Id., July 20, 1935, at 2.
39 Id., July 31, 1935, at 18.
40 U.S. CONGRESS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATVES, HOUSE RULES Comi-nnE, INVESTIGATION
or LOBBYING ON UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY BILLS, 74th Cong., Ist Sess., part 1, July 9-17
[no other parts published], at 3 (1935).41 !d. at 32.
42 Id.
4 3 1 d. at 85.
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Times reported that the conferees had not met for the last three weeks. The
representatives appointed to the committee had refused to meet if any
outsiders were present. They specifically objected to the presence of Dozier
Devane, of the Federal Power Commission, and Benjamin Cohen, of the
Public Works Administration, both of whom had helped draft large parts
of the original bill. The congressmen argued, quite correctly, that this was
an executive session, closed to the public and no one but the conferees
should be present. If the senators desired to hold a public session with no
restrictions on attendance, this was acceptable to the House. Although the
senators realized the substantial validity of the representatives' arguments,
they persisted in their demand for the presence of Devane and Cohen,
pointing out earlier precedents for the action. In substance this was a ploy
to stall deliberations until Black had turned up sufficient fraud, manipula-
tion, and money behind the utilities lobby to destroy the image of grass-
roots support.44
The most damaging testimony Black produced concerned the tele-
graphic deluge. Black later estimated this phase of the utilities' campaign
accounted for over 2 50,000 telegrams.46 These telegrams were written, paid
for, and sometimes signed with forged signatures, by utility executives.
The testimony of Representative Denis J. Driscoll (Dem., Pa.) gave Black
his first clue. The large number of signatures starting with letters in the
first part of the alphabet first aroused Driscoll's suspicions. The B's alone
comprised 14 per cent of the total.46 On investigating further, Driscoll
found that many people denied sending him the telegrams. In other cases
the Post Office returned Driscoll's replies to the telegrams, marked "ad-
dressee unknown." The testimony of Jack A. Fisher, manager of the West-
ern Union office in Warren, Pennsylvania, explained this discrepancy.
During the time the bill was between the House and the Senate, Mr. Herron
[an official of Utilities Investing Corporation, which itself was a subsidiary
of A. G. & E., a prominent holding company] would come in almost daily
for a period of an hour... or two ... and he would dictate these messages
to me and the signatures, and his signatures were obtained from a list
which he had in his hand, or from the city directory.47
On further questioning, Fisher stated that he had no reason to challenge
44 N.Y. Times, July 25, 1935, at 1; Id., Aug. 1, 1935, at 11.
4 5 This was noted in a speech on Aug. 8, 1935, delivered over the National Broadcasting
Corporation network. Hugo L. Black, Lobby Investigation, I ViTAL SPEECHES, Aug. 26, 1935,
at 764 [hereinafter cited as Black, Lobby Investigation].
46 Hearings, Black Committee, supra note 19, at 61-62, 76. Telegrams sent to Driscoll:
A to M, 596; N to Z, 220: total, 816.
4 7 Hearings, Black Committee, supra note 19, at 64.
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Herron's authorization to sign the telegrams because, as an employee of
Western Union, his sole interest was in the revenue to his company.4 8 This
represented the nadir of the utilities' telegram campaign.
The opponents of the Wheeler-Rayburn Bill also used other means to
gather signatures. On July 18 the testimony of Mr. F. R. Veale, general
superintendent of the eastern division of Western Union, disclosed that
messenger boys, paid three cents for each signature, had collected author-
izations for the utility interests.49 One of the more amusing episodes
occurred when Chairman Black questioned Paul Elmer Danielson, one
of the messenger boys in Warren, Pennsylvania.
Chairman Black wondered by what means Elmer had won over six citizens:
What did you tell them? The boy beamed: Why I explained the Wheeler-
Rayburn bill to them! The Senator waited for laughter to subside: And
where do you stand on the question today? Elmer's eyes shifted: Well, I
guess I'm neutral now.50
The well-planned method of operations of the utilities lobby emerged
as the testimony of local Western Union officials revealed that the central
Western Union office in New York had informed the local offices of the im-
minence of the telegraphic deluge several weeks in advance so that they
would be ready for the increased business. "I The utilities took care to cover
their tracks well. Their agents paid for the telegrams in cash so no written
record would remain.'2
The utility lobby did not rely solely on the city directory or paid
solicitors to gather signatures; they also coerced their employees into
signing messages. The Metropolitan Edison Company had taken the pay-
roll of the New York Street Railway System and signed the names of
every employee and his next of kin, including at least one dead man, to
the messages. 53 Of course, the employees, in a time of mass unemployment,
remained free to object to their supervisors if they disapproved of this
action !
Once the utilities realized that Black was on their trail, they sought
to destroy all incriminating evidence. In Warren, Pennsylvania, someone
had carefully burned all records of the forged telegrams. Jack A. Fisher,
manager of the Warren Western Union office threw some light on this. In
4 8 Id. at 74.
49 N.Y. Times, July 18, 1935, at 11.5 0 Lobbies: Investigating Committee Smells Smoke and Uncovers a Fire: Even the Dead
Protested, 6 NEWSwEax, July 27, 1935, at 7.
51 Hearings, Black Committee, supra note 19, at 91.
52 N.Y. Times, July 18,1935, at 1.
53 Id., July 24, 1935, at 1.
[Vol. 29:543
BLACK'S CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
a conversation with R. P. Herron of A. G. & E., Herron had suggested
"[it] would be a good idea if somebody threw a barrel of kerosene in the
cellar." Fisher, at the time, received that as a joke." More ludicrous than
sinister, this episode served to further tarnish the reputation of the holding
companies. Black persistently drew out all the details. Federal law required
copies of all telegrams to be retained for a period of one year. The normal
procedure in the Warren office was for one of the messenger boys to burn
the appropriate months of the prior year's messages after the required
lapse of time. However, Arthur F. Christianson, a clerk at the Warren
office, deviated from the normal procedure and himself performed this
"janitor work," as Danielson had earlier termed it. The Committee never
definitely established who actually burned the messages, although most of
the evidence pointed to Christianson.', That someone had burned the mes-
sages was apparent after Mr. Fisher had testified. He found charred re-
mains of the messages among the ashes in the cellar of the Western Union
office. The few legible words and dates connected these remains with the
missing messages. 56
On July 23, the Federal Communications Commission ordered all
eight telegraph companies to report on destruction of these records. Such
a violation of federal law could bring a fine of $1,000 to $5,000 or one to
five years' imprisonment, or both.57 Ursal E. Beach, head of the securities
department of A. G. & E., supplied the next link in the well-concealed chain
of events. He admitted that he had ordered the destruction by A. G. & E.
subsidiaries of all written evidence bearing on the propaganda campaign.
The testimony of E. W. O'Brien, of Utilities Investing Corporation, an
A. G. & E. subsidiary, confirmed this. He stated that on Beach's order he
had destroyed his own records.58
The utilities did not limit themselves to telegrams and letter writing.
Leuchtenberg cites one correspondent's estimate that "there were more
utility lobbyists than congressmen"59 in Washington. Black pictured them
as storming the capital. "Hotels buzzed as though another national con-
vention were in town....
That the utility interests used advertising expenditures to influence
newspaper editorial columns was well known. Black furnished the specifics
by questioning a utility lobbyist, Philip Gadsden, head of the Committee
54 Hearings, Black Committee, supra note 19, at 68.
55 Id. at 97.
56 Id. at 69.
57 N.Y. Times, July 24, 1935, at 5.
58 Id., July 19, 1935, at 1; Id., July 20, 1935, at 1.
59 LEUCH=ENBRG, supra note 20, at 155.
60 Black, Lobby Investigation, supra note 45, at 765.
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of Public Utility Executives, on a memorandum found in his office. After
speaking of some favorable, from the utilities' standpoint, editorials on the
Wheeler-Rayburn Bill, the memorandum concludes with "Your own ad-
vertising will further stimulate editorial comment all over the country."'
Gadsden reacted by denying that this was the actual practice. It was just
an idea submitted for consideration but obviously rejected. Questioned
further, he modified his stance by conceding that giving advertising to one
paper and not another might incur ill will.62 On July 24 the Committee
heard another witness tell how A. G. & E. had dropped the York Dispatch,
a local Pennsylvania paper, from its advertising list after a reporter work-
ing for the Dispatch had relayed an article on the faking of telegrams to
the Philadelphia Record. 3
In another area Black sought to pinpoint the range of activities of the
utility lobbyists in the nation's capital. The utilities made various informa-
tion services available to interested congressmen, as well as other op-
ponents of the Wheeler-Rayburn Bill. Sometimes the information supplied
was conveniently organized into the form of a speech. Black's interrogation
of Mr. Burnham Carter, of Ivy Lee and T. J. Ross, public relations coun-
sel, is illustrative.
BLACK: Did you write a speech for her? [a radio commentator, Cath-
erine Curtis]
CARTER: No, Sir.
BLACK: Are you sure you did not?
CARTER: I supplied material for her.
BLACK: Look at that, Mr. Carter.
CARTER: Yes, sir; this is my document.
BLACK: What is that?
CARTER: Well, I guess it says "draft." I consider it a memorandum."
Black further tried to ferret out the real purposes of the high fees
paid to various law firms. The utility lobbyists explained that these pay-
ments were for advice as to the legal interpretation of the bill, analyses
of its provisions, and preparation of various amendments. The following
interchange between Gadsden and Black pointed up the thin line between
legal services and outright lobbying.
BLACK: They did not have anything to do, of course, with trying to
defeat the bill?
GADSDEN: Oh, no; not a thing. Their job was to advise us.
61 Hearings, Black Committee, supra note 19, at 47.
62 Id. at 49-50.
63 N.Y. Times, July 24, 1935, at 5.
6 Hearings, Black Committee, supra note 19, at 37.
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BLACK: They were to advise you how to defeat it.
GADSDEN: That is right .... 65
In his probe of lobbying activity, Black called Patrick J. Hurley,
Secretary of War in the Hoover Cabinet. Hurley was a recalcitrant witness
who strongly objected that the Committee had singled out him, a Republi-
can lawyer, for its investigation. He further argued that with a Democratic
Congress his influence was not "worth a nickel to anybody."6 Testimony
before the Committee revealed that Hurley had received $85,000 for his
services in "advising" the utilities on the Wheeler-Rayburn Bill. A prom-
inent Democratic attorney, Joseph P. Tumulty, also came before the Com-
mittee. He had received $33,500, $7,500 of which he paid to other attorneys
for their assistance." In reality, the facts indicated, these Washington
lawyers might well be considered high-priced influence peddlers, their
affluence and political connections bringing them more respectability than
they might otherwise have merited."
The only hint of outright bribery arose from the testimony of Eugene
B. Sellers. Sellers, working for the N. R. A., and a close associate of
Representative Pat Patton of Texas, testified that on the Sunday morning
before the vote on the death sentence clause, he had seen Patton return
from a meeting with Joseph W. Carpenter, president of the Texas Power
and Light Company, carrying a box wrapped in newspaper. Sellers further
reported that he had heard Patton's nephew say, "Hell no, that wasn't
cigars," and "Uncle had bought a bond and it wasn't pay day."69 Patton
and Carpenter neglected to confer beforehand and Black took full ad-
vantage of their inconsistent stories. Carpenter did not recall giving any-
thing to a congressman, except perhaps a box of cigars, whereas Patton
remembered that he had taken some Department of Agriculture pamphlets
on the diseases of horses and cattle from Carpenter's room. These pam-
phlets, an earlier gift to Carpenter's son, Patton took with him to mail to
Carpenter's home in Texas because his son did not have time to read them
in Washington." Patton's testimony before the Black Committee is a re-
markable attempt at evasion and introduction of irrelevancy. Starting out
by recalling that he had married "a pretty little girl, a girl from the good
old state of Alabama,"171 he continued in the same vein. Black gave him
every opportunity to defend himself, allowing extended speeches, although
6
r Id. at 46.
66 N.Y. Times, Aug. 7,1935, at 1.
67 Id., Aug. 8, 1935, at 10.
68 K. C AwFoRD, THE PRFssuRE Boys 57, 61-62 (1939).
69 N.Y. Times, July 27,1935, at 4.
70 Id., July 25, 1935, at 4; Id., July 26, 1935, at 4.
71 Hearings, Black Committee, supra note 19, at 530.
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still continuing to question him closely on his finances, drawing out that he
had purchased $3,000 worth of government bonds on a salary of $3,100
in the four months he had been a congressman.72 A few days later Patton
submitted a revised financial statement which upped his income to $5,100."
Following his appearance before the Black Committee, Patton got a
sympathetic hearing from O'Connor's Rules Committee.74 There Patton,
his daughter, and nephew all denied the charges made earlier. The testi-
mony of greatest significance was that of Mr. Shook, Patton's nephew, for
he denied Sellers' earlier hearsay account. Thus, O'Connor continued his
tactics of obstruction. He devoted his hearings to charges against the Ad-
ministration and defense of those investigated by Black. In spite of
O'Connor's efforts, Patton's activities, if not illegal, seemed suspicious.
Although Black failed to accumulate sufficient evidence to take further
action against Patton, he brought out into the open the type of clandestine
activity the utilities were using to apply pressure.
The costs of the lobbying campaign now fell under the Black Commit-
tee's searching eyes. On July 18, Burnham Carter informed the Commit-
tee that his firm, Ivy Lee and T. J. Ross, had received fees of $5,000 per
month for advising the public utility executives about public relations and
preparing and distributing various news releases and statements. 7 Lobby-
ing fees per se, i.e., for such things as printing and binding of statements
($38,148), advertising ($27,720), and public relations counsel ($22,750)
amounted to $151,865, according to a statement which the Committee of
Public Utility Executives presented to Black.7 ' Added to legal fees of
$150,000 paid to the law firms of Sullivan and Cromwell, and Simpson,
Thacher and Bartlett, this one group spent over $300,000 to fight the
Wheeler-Rayburn Bill.1 7 This was only a fraction of the total expended.
To get the full amount one must sum the expenditures of the other lobbying
committees, the holding companies, and their subsidiaries. For example,
Joseph W. Carpenter, president of Texas Public Power and Light Com-
pany, admitted spending $33,777 for lobbying expenses.7 s Incidentally, he
charged this to the company's operating expenses, thus bearing out Black's
contention that the consumer was ultimately to pay the bill. The New
York Times summarized the outlays the Black Committee had thus far
brought to light.79
72 Id. at 560.
73 N.Y. Times, July 29, 1935, at 3.
74 Id., Aug. 3, 1935, at 2.
75 Hearings, Black Committee, supra note 19, at 8.
76 Id. at 55.
77 1d. at 28.
7 8 N.Y. Times, July 25, 1935, at 4.
79 Id., July 26, 1935, at 4.
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A. G. & E. $ 700,000
Committee of Public Utility Executives 300,000
American Federation of Utility Investors 25,000
Texas Power 33,777
B. B. Robinson (a utility lobbyist) 885
$1,059,662
One million dollars was no doubt a minimum; Black later estimated the
total cost to be at least five times that."
These revelations led naturally to another question. What sort of
corporate financial structure permitted the expenditure of such astro-
nomical sums? A. G. & E. had no money to pay dividends in recent years,
as U. E. Beach testified, yet was "able to pay out $700,000 to defeat this
legislation."'" This strange contradiction seemed to confirm the Brandei-
sian thesis of corporate mismanagement of "other people's money."
Certainly the utility executives could not attribute the default in
dividends to inability to pay for the top quality management. Philip
Gadsden was paid $31,000 by the United Gas Improvement Company,
while John E. Zimmerman, its president, received approximately $90,000,
according to Gadsden's testimony. 2 But these men, while arguably over-
paid, did not cold-bloodedly drain off their company's assets as did Howard
C. Hopson of A. G. & E. Stewart P. Ross, assistant counsel for the New
York State Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate Public Utilities,
disclosed these facts about Hopson's income. Although A. G. & E. had
suspended cash dividends in 1931 and stock dividends in 1932, Hopson's
income or the income of corporations controlled solely by Hopson or his
family averaged well above $500,000 for the period 1929-1933.1
At this point in the investigation, President Roosevelt officially came
to the aid of the Black Committee by opening all federal tax returns to its
inspection. Significantly, the Executive Order did not mention the House
Rules Committee investigating the same matter.8 4 The same week the
President's name was again connected with the Black Committee's investi-
gation as E. P. Cramer, an advertising agency employee, testified that he
had initiated the idea of a "whispering campaign" designed to create popu-
lar suspicion that the "new dealers and especially the 'New Dealer-in-
80 H. Black, Inside a Senate Investigation, HARPER'S MAGAznE, Feb., 1936, at 275-86.
8 1 N.Y. Times, July 20,1935, at 2.
82 Hearings, Black Committee, supra note 19, at 25-26.
83 N.Y. Times, July 30, 1935, at 14. Profits of Hopson's companies: 1929, $575,000; 1930,
$852,000; 1931, $393,000; 1932, $533,000; 1933, $449,000; total, $2,805,000.
84 Id., Aug. 1, 1935, at 1.
1976]
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
chief' are either incompetent or insane. . . ."" Black saved this bombshell
for the day of the House roll call vote on the Wheeler-Rayburn Bill, thus
underscoring the political implications of his investigation. Cramer's sug-
gestion, made to C. E. Groesbeck, chairman of the board of directors of
Electric Bond and Share, a utilities holding company, never, according to
Groesbeck, received serious consideration. After all, a man "cannot be re-
sponsible for suggestions and statements in a letter written to [him].""
Roosevelt gave his view of the matter at his press conference of August 2,
the following day.
Q-you probably saw the paper. Is there anything you can tell us
further about this so-called "whispering campaign?"
The President: Except probably the least surprised by most of that
testimony was perhaps myself.87
A few days later Cramer's employer discharged him, stating that although
no evidence existed that he actually participated in such a campaign, "his
advocacy of so reprehensible a plan is sufficient to warrant his release from
this company." 8 Cramer's discharge is exceptional, apparently the only
instance of retaliation directed at a witness for his testimony. Only bitter
partisans could accuse Black of a witch hunt. In the sole example of
retribution the initiative came from private industry and not from the
Black Committee.
The more responsible utility interests were at first somewhat willing
to cooperate, but they soon changed their tactics to adamant opposition to
the Black Committee." A. G. & E., Hopson's firm, and many others, were
recalcitrant from the first. Resorting to exaggeration and distortion of
facts, the utility lobbyists criticized the procedure of the Black Committee.
Philip H. Gadsden complained that Black's agents surprised him at his
office whereupon they rushed him off to testify, without time for the slight-
est preparation. Furthermore, while he was testifying before the Commit-
tee, Gadsden charged that the Committee's investigators, without any
search warrant, had ransacked his papers, reading them all, both personal
and business, and removing those items of interest to them. The New York
Times' account contradicted this, stating that the investigators bore
subpoenas.9 ° Williams uncritically follows Gadsden's account of the inci-
dent.91 Black's investigator, H. A. Blomquist, replied to the charges the
85 Hearings, Black Committee, supra note 19, at 817.
86 N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1935, at 2.
87 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Press Conferences, No. 226, Microfilm 3566, Aug. 2, 1935.
88 N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1935, at 1.
89 Hearings, Black Committee, supra note 19, at 52.
9 0 N.Y. Times, July 13,1935, at 1.
91 WNM.Tms, supra note 12, at 59.
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next day. He stated that he had only sequestered the correspondence and
files found in Gadsden's office at the Mayflower Hotel, not his apartment
located elsewhere. While this was going on, Gadsden's secretary and others
were present and were permitted to examine everything taken from the
records. 2 Black was clearly in the right in this dispute, refusing to be
taken in by the claim that business papers were personal. Gadsden's out-
cry, based on emotion, tried to arouse doubts as to Black's adherence to
constitutional limitsf 3 This foreshadowed Hearst's attack, although on a
smaller scale. The New York Times reported that Black questioned Gads-
den "in such rapid fire fashion that new questions were being asked...
before answers could be obtained to the preceding one."94 If this was a
grievance, no one else, including Gadsden, complained of it.
Another procedural dispute involved Black's refusal to allow F. S.
Burroughs, vice president of A. G. & E., or Carl Estes, editor-publisher
from Longview, Texas, to make statements or have them published in the
record. 5 Black's philosophy of congressional investigation emphasized
fact-finding. The Committee would gather information by asking specific
questions, while demanding and receiving short and to the point answers.
The investigation was not a trial and the same procedures did not apply as
would have been used in a court of law.96 Burroughs even demanded the
witness fee of $3 per day and expenses. Black pointed out that Burroughs
made $60,000 a year and clinched his argument by quoting Burroughs'
earlier statement demanding to come before the Committee, "I want every-
body to know I came here of my own volition and I've been trying to come
before this committee for a week. 97
The editorial reactions to the revelations of the Black Committee were
diverse. The New York Times argued that the utility lobby was a defensive
measure against Administration lobbying and the public ownership crowd
and as such was merely an extension of the ancient right of petition.
Furthermore, legitimate holding company executives showed considerable
anxiety lest some extremist "make a fool of himself. 918 This point of view
minimized the results of Black's investigation. The Chicago Daily News
(independent) ignored Black's committee and instead urged O'Connor to
"Rip off the lid"99 from Administration lobbying. The Commercial and
92 N.Y. Times, July 14, 1935, at 18.
93 Id., July 27, 1935, at 4.
94 Id., July 13,1935, at 1.
95 Id., July 30,1935, at 14.
96 Hearings, Black Committee, supra note 19, at 618.
97 6 NEWSWEEK, Mar. 14, 1935, at 21.
9 8 N.Y. Times, July 18,1935, at 18.
9 9 Lobby Investigation Widens, 120 L=RARY DIGzsT, July 20, 1935, at 5.
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Financial Chronicle did an about-face when on July 13 it editorialized
that "no concrete evidence of anything of the nature of lobbying had been
shown, merely ordinary efforts to bring a point of view to the attention of
the public." The following week the telegram scandals in Warren and
Meadville had their effect. Terming such acts indefensible, this prominent
business journal expressed the hope that the whole utilities industry would
not be made to suffer because of the actions of the irresponsible few."'0
Representing another point of view, the Christian Century denounced
the utility industry's tactics as "more than criminal."'' The Portland
Oregon Journal (independent-Republican) asserted that the investigation
was necessary to protect self-government from the power of the utility
lobby and urged an "all-exhaustive probe." 02 The Charleston (W. Va.)
Gazette (independent-Democrat) saw the utility lobby as "fairly and
squarely caught with the goods."" 3
Inseparable from the political scene, the effectiveness of the Black
Committee was now to be judged on the floor of the House. On August 1,
Representative Huddleston successfully put to a vote his motion to exclude
Cohen and Devane from the deliberations of the conference committee. His
success in this foreshadowed the House defeat of the death sentence clause,
this time on a roll call vote, 210-155, with practically all Republicans
voting against the bill and the Democrats almost equally divided. 104
The debate on the floor of the House illustrates the intimate political con-
nection of the Black investigation to the death sentence clause vote. Sam
Rayburn (Dem., Tex.) asked the clerk to read a news service account of
the whispering campaign testimony of E. P. Cramer. Representative
Cooper of Ohio charged that the Senate investigation was being "held as
a club over the members of Congress.1 °5 Cooper's analysis, although
rhetorically extreme, was politically accurate. Most political observers of
the day supported this view.'
Thus, the first phase of the Black investigation was drawing to a
close. The effort had to be regarded as a political failure. Black had only
one more chance to effect his purpose: He had to find the elusive Howard
100 CommmRciAL AND FinANCIAL CHRONiCLE, July 13 and 20, 1935, at 152 and 318.
101 Desperate Methods of Utility Companies, 52 TnE Cm sTL CENTURY, July 31, 1935,
at 981.
102 120 LITRARY DIGEST, July 20, 1935, at 5.
103 Lobbying by Wire, 120 LrrERARW DIGEST, Aug. 3,1935, at 37.
104 N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1935, at 11; Id., Aug. 2,1935, at 1-2.
lo5 Id., Aug. 2, 1935, at 2.
L06 Utilities: Lobby Scandals Sway Only a Few Congressmen; House Again Kills 'Death
Sentence', 6 NEWSWEEK, Aug. 10, 1935, at 10-11.
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C. Hopson. The "Hopson Hunt" provided most of the political fireworks
during the 1935 phase of the Black investigation. It was this episode which
was largely responsible for final passage of the Wheeler-Rayburn Bill.
"Eliza crossing the ice, hotly pursued by bloodhounds, had nothing on
Howard 0. Hopson," wrote Robert S. Allen, Washington correspondent of
the Philadelphia Record (Ind.). "Through the corridors of leading Wash-
ington hotels, over the rolling meadows of near-by Virginia, through the
highways and byways of adjacent Maryland, troops of Congressional agents,
G men, police, and assorted sleuths sniffed excitedly on the trail of the
elusive utility baron.' 07
Hopson had a long established record of avoiding appearances before
Senate committees. The Senate Banking Committee (Ferdinand Pecora,
chairman) did not succeed in apprehending Hopson until a United States
marshal served a subpoena on him in Chicago.'08 Black threatened a similar
nationwide search on July 31. L 9 Nothing turned up until on August 12
agents of the House Rules Committee announced that they had found
Hopson and that he would be a witness before the Committee the follow-
ing morning. 0 O'Connor's questioning during the Rules Committee ses-
sions was so amicable that it drew widespread comment. Later testimony
made it clear that Hopson or his attorney had arranged in advance to
surrender to O'Connor's committee."'
Black tried to get Hopson before his own committee during those
times when he was not testifying before the House. Senate Report 1272
recounts Black's efforts in this regard. 1 An agent of Black's committee
finally succeeded in serving a subpoena on Hopson. Hopson's attorney,
W. A. Hill, aided by O'Connor and the District of Columbia police, had
blocked the first attempt. Black's committee called the policemen involved
and listened to their version of the facts before taking further action. The
evidence indicated a well thought-out plan to prevent Hopson's appearance
before the Black Committee. Black, having called his committee to order
to await Hopson's attorney, tried to contact him, then went directly to the
floor of the Senate and obtained, by unanimous vote, a contempt citation." 8
Senator Robinson, the majority leader, suggested postponement until the
following day, but Black prevailed. Further action proved unnecessary as
107 Utility Baron in Eliza Role, 120 LrEmRA y DIGEST, Aug. 17, 1935, at 6.
108 N.Y. Times, July 28,1935, at 23.
100 Id., July 31, 19359, at 18.
110 Id., Aug. 13, 1935, at 1.
11 Id., Aug. 14, 1935, at 15; Utilities: Senate Agent Almost Nabs Himself in Hopson
Huint, 6 NEwswrxx, Aug. 24,1935, at 8.
12 79 CoNG. REc. 13064 (1935).
113 Id. at 13077.
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Hopson voluntarily appeared the following day, not, however, without an-
other attempt at escape.
O'Connor, by now quite obviously Hopson's ally, offered a resolution
to the House which would have directed the House's sergeant-at-arms to
arrest Hopson and keep him in custody until O'Connor finished question-
ing him." 4 Such an action would have effectively precluded Black from
ever interrogating Hopson because it would have nullified the legal effect
of Black's subpoena. O'Connor's action failed, largely because the mem-
bers of his own committee refused to support him." 5 Recognizing the in-
evitable, O'Connor agreed to a compromise whereby the two committees,
"Solomon like" divided Hopson in two. The compromise provided that
"the House would question him each morning, the Senate each after-
noon.""' 6 O'Connor's record in this affair is consistent with his general
policy of obstruction of the Roosevelt Administration, although he did not
break openly with the President until 1938.111
In the search for Hopson, a revealing episode occurred. The Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms Chesley Jurney, while looking for Hopson, called on an
A. G. & E. lobbyist, B. B. Robinson, and to his chagrin he found not Hop-
son but a group including Marvin McIntyre, the President's secretary, L.
W. Robert, Jr., of the Treasury Department, Amon Carter, a Texas news-
paper publisher, and Senator Tydings of Maryland." 8 Senator Gibson
(Rep., Vt.), took this opportunity to denounce the Washington social
lobby. Although nothing more came of this incident, it is instructive for
two reasons. First, it indicates the subtle personal relationships which
lobbyists can use to attain their ends. Second, publisher Carter attempted
to suppress the story by threatening the reporters present with loss of their
jobs. Carter's paper was a customer of all three press services. He failed
only because a Hearst reporter did not succumb to his intimidation.
Hopson proved to be worthy of the pursuit. Once Black had Hopson
before the Committee, the full story of the utility lobby emerged. Black
elicited more information from Hopson in two hours than O'Connor had in
two full days of hearings." 9 Black's first line of questioning concerned
Hopson's attempt, as president of A. G. & E., to influence editorial policy
by advertising. He quoted from a telegram signed by Hopson, "Am inclined
to think we ought to withhold patronage of this paper in line with our
114 Ward, Shenanigans of the Power Lobby, 141 NATION, Aug. 28, 1935, at 235.
115 Id.; N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1935, at 1.
116 6 NEwsWEEK, Aug. 24, 1935, at 9.
117 K. CRAWFORD, TnE PREssuRE Boys 63 (1939).
118 Id. at 67; N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1935, at 1; Ward, Shenanigans of the Power Lobby,
141 NATION, Aug. 28,1935, at 235.
119 Ward, supra note 114, at 235.
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former practice... "012o and then asked for an explanation of its meaning.
Hopson explained that he thought it unwise for A. G. & E. to advertise in
papers which ignored the worthwhile contributions of the utilities and
instead published only anti-utility propaganda. The New York Times,
Hopson indicated, was dominated by other financial interests. That was
an additional reason for A. G. & E.'s withdrawal of advertising. 2'
Hopson's influence on the newspapers was not solely negative. A
positive side consisted in suggesting topics for editorials. Black's presenta-
tion of a Hearst editorial and a Hopson telegram of the preceding day,
suggesting a similar editorial, established a causal relationship which is
hard to ignore. 22 Hopson himself admitted, "Yes. I looked up all of the
newspapers I could find, and magazines that had holding companies and
tried my best to bring to their attention that the heat would soon be turned
on them if they let us go over the deep end.' 23
Black also zeroed in on the letter writing campaign. He found in
Hopson's correspondence, as early as February 21, 1935, a suggestion of the
plan. Hopson's letter suggested that it would be best to write letters re-
quiring replies because "that makes it necessary to do a little work to
answer them, and they will appreciate more fully the volume of the opposi-
tion.' 24 When questioned as to the destruction of records, Hopson ex-
plained this as standard procedure for interoffice memoranda, that
A. G. & E. never retained such records. Black then inquired why Hopson
requested carbon copies from his correspondents. 25
Black was accumulating a vast volume of evidence clearly exposing
the practices of the utility lobby. On August 15 Black read a report into
the record showing expenditures of $875,000 by A. G. & E. alone in the
utility lobbying campaign. 26 Black did not miss another chance to pub-
licize Hopson's business ethics. On August 16 he questioned Hopson on
his attempt to avoid appearing in a lawsuit in New York state. Hopson
accomplished this by obtaining an affidavit from his physician certifying
that he was too ill to testify. 27
Black responded to the criticisms of the Committee for investigating
only the most disreputable holding companies, such as A. G. & E., by
reading a telegram which referred to a request by Wendell Wilkie, presi-
1 2 0 HEHPis, BLAci ComrrTaE, 1046.
121 Id. at 1047.
1 2 2 
.EARNs, BLACK Coiunmrr, 1058.
123 Id. at 988.
12 4 Id. at 990.
125 Id. at 1040.
126 Id. at 1004.
12 7 Id. at 1031-32.
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dent of Commonwealth and Southern Corporation, for a memorandum
from A. G. & E. on how he should testify on the Wheeler-Rayburn Bill.
Wilkie, in his public speeches, had always refused to associate with Hop-
son's organizations. 28
On the procedural side, Black had several advantages. Black had sub-
poenaed from the various telegraph companies all of Hopson's correspon-
dence. He used it to the fullest extent. Several times Hopson complained
that Black would not permit him to examine these telegrams. Black ignored
this request, obliquely referring to Hopson's prior destruction of his own
records.129 Another tactic of Black's was his insistence on short, direct
answers. He refused to allow evasion. He expressed his point of view as
follows: "Yes; I want the truth, but I do not care to have any discussions
or arguments or philosophies. We are asking for facts. If we want philoso-
phies, we will ask for them." 8°
On August 21 Black read a statement by the Committee threatening
to charge Hopson with contempt if he persisted in evading questions, mak-
ing speeches, criticizing the Committee, rambling beyond the scope of the
question, or continuing to talk after being called to order.' 3 ' This had great
effect on Hopson, as the New York Times reported. Formerly reluctant to
answer questions bearing on profits to himself or his family, he began to
talk freely.'3 2
By August 21, the Hopson testimony had the desired results. A pro-
posed compromise on the death sentence clause was now in sight. The
original Senate bill would have dissolved all but first degree holding com-
panies by 1940 and the others by 1942 unless the Securities and Exchange
Commission considered them in the public interest. The House bill, in con-
trast, would have dissolved all holding companies by 1940, although the
Securities and Exchange Commission would have power to permit indefi-
nite continuance. 1' Actually quite close together, a compromise was not
hard to work out once the political obstacles had been overcome. The
compromise, which eventually became law, dissolved all holding companies
above the second degree and gave the Securities and Exchange Commission
power to dissolve holding companies of the second degree unless they met
specific criteria limiting them to a single integrated system.""
On August 24 the Senate and House adopted the Conference Report,
128 Id. at 1041.
129 Id. at 1036.
130 Id. at 990.
131 Id. at 1096-97.
132 N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1935, at 35.
133 Id., Aug. 23, 1935, at 8.
134 Id., Aug. 21, 1935, at 35; Id., Aug. 22, 1935, at 8; Id., Aug. 25, 1935, at 2.
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the Senate without a roll call, the House by a vote of 222-112."1 The gen-
eral opinion credits Black's investigation, especially his questioning of
Hopson, with this result.'36 To the extent that Hopson's testimony spot-
lighted the abuses of the holding company system, which it amply did, this
is correct. Black originally undertook the investigation with this purpose
in mind. All the evidence indicates that he adhered to it throughout the
course of the investigation.
On August 23, the first phase of Black's investigation had come to an
end. The last day of hearings departed from the usual topic and took up
the issue of the shipping lobby. Black heard testimony that a plan was in
motion to defeat Roosevelt's direct subsidy plan and continue the exist-
ing system of subsidy by mail contracts. The events of the day bore this
out. Black abruptly recessed his committee and hurried to the floor of the
Senate to battle against this surprise move by the shipping interests. He
failed in this attempt. 37 At this point there was still uncertainty as to
whether Black would continue his investigation, although it was reported
to be likely. 38
With the meeting of the new session of Congress in March, the Black
Committee resumed its work. Operating under broad powers to investigate
all types of lobbying, the Committee did not end its work with the passage
of the Wheeler-Rayburn Bill. However, in its topics of investigation, the
Committee hearings took on a changed tone. This second phase of the in-
vestigation had a modified aim. Having discovered the effectiveness of the
congressional probe, Black intended to fully politicize his success and to
use this weapon to aid in the 1936 campaign. His political strategy was
to demonstrate that much of the opposition to the New Deal was a dan-
gerous artificial creation of big business. But here Black ran into trouble.
Relying on his power of subpoena, Black had sought to gather evidence by
examining the telegrams sent or received by various individuals. Although
Black at no time technically exceeded constitutional limitations on such
power, not even approaching the widespread use of the subpoena power
during the uncovering of the Teapot Dome scandals, his political opponents
seized on this as a convenient point of attack.
Before starting the new phase of the investigation, a few items re-
mained from the previous year. The testimony of Henry L. Doherty, prin-
cipal controlling figure in the Cities Service system, brought out that he had
185 Id., Aug. 25, 1935, at 1.
136 Fatux, supra note 7 at 80-81; Lane, Some Lessons from Past Congressional Investi-
gations of Lobbying, 14 PuB. Onr-on Q., at 32, as reprinted in the 96 CONG. REc. A1203 at
A1205 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Lane] ; N.Y. Times, July 24, 1935, at 3.
137 N.Y. Times, Aug. 24,1935, at 3.
'
3 8 Id., Aug. 18,1935, at 1.
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disposed of 200,000 shares of Cities Service stock shortly before the
market crash of 1929, realizing a profit of $17,800,000.111 Ending the pre-
occupation with the utilities was the testimony of Victor A. Dorsey of
Chicago, an expert appraiser of utility properties. He indicated that most
utility stocks were worthless because the total value of public utility prop-
erty would just equal the liability for outstanding bonds. 4 '
Probing further into the lobbying activity, Black heard Robert E.
Smith, a lobbyist representing the National Conference of Investors, tell
an interesting story of how he and six members of Congress had shared a
suburban house in Washington the last summer. Interestingly enough,
Representative Samuel B. Pettengill of Indiana, bitter foe of the Wheeler-
Rayburn Bill, was one of the six.'
The chief aspect of the renewed investigation centered on the activi-
ties of such anti-New Deal groups as the Liberty League, Farmers Inde-
pendence Council of America, Southern Committee to Defend the
Constitution, and the Sentinels of the Republic. The New York Times con-
sidered this work valuable in exposing the gullibility of ordinarily hard-
headed businessmen who, faced with a sharp political promoter, reacted
with simple-minded naivete." Black proved the interconnections of these
groups. Most derived financial support from the same group of wealthy
businessmen. Typical of their interrelations was the disclosure by Black
that one organizer of the Farmer's Council was being paid by the Liberty
League during the Council's initial organizational period.
The anti-New Deal convention held at Macon, Georgia, in late Janu-
ary of 1936, which endorsed Governor Talmadge as an anti-Roosevelt
candidate, was a target of the politicized Black investigation. The Senate
Committee scored a triumph when they revealed that John J. Raskob and
Pierre S. du Pont were the principal financial backers of the movement. At
this convention various racist literature was distributed. Neither Raskob
nor du Pont made any attempt to interfere with this approach. 4 Another
group, the American Taxpayer's League also made the headlines. J. A.
Arnold, the manager of the Taxpayers' League, became very angry when
the Senate Committee questioned him. The Committee had reminded
Arnold that a former investigation by the Caraway Committee had focused
attention on his unusual financial practices. Arnold destroyed all financial
-13 Id., Afar. 3, 1936, at 7.
14 0 Id., Afar. 4, 1936, at 7.
141 Id., Mar. 17, 1936, at 3.
142 Id., Apr. 17, 1936, at 20.
148 Id., Apr. 16, 1936, at 2.
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records annually, preserving only his auditor's report. His auditor was
subsequently convicted and sentenced for fraud.144
Fred G. Clark, national commander of the Crusaders, defended his
group by saying, "We did not receive a dollar in contributions from any
public utility company."'1 45 The Senate Committee's records proved the
contrary. Cities Service, Commonwealth Edison, as well as other large com-
panies had made substantial contributions to the Crusaders. Such brazen
deception of the public, Black felt, deserved exposure. Only Congress had
sufficient authority to deal with such misrepresentation. Black himself
proposed legislation which would give the public information on the activi-
ties and financial backing of such groups. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch con-
sidered such legislation beneficial in that it would end many of the abuses
of lobbying by forcing them out into public view. The New York Times
considered the bill partisan, drastic, and too restrictive. Although neither
Black's bill nor a similar one in the House became law, similar proposals
were enacted by a later Congress. 46
Silas Strawn, a Chicago attorney whose correspondence was sub-
poenaed by Black, decided to challenge him by taking legal action to enjoin
Western Union from handing over copies of his telegrams to Black. His
main argument, later accepted by the court, was that Black was conducting
"a general inquisitorial investigation and fishing expedition. . . ." As
a practical matter the case was of little import, for Black had already
received most of the telegrams that he had subpoenaed. However, one can
well understand the potential this action had to cripple future investiga-
tions by noting that over 50 per cent of Black's documentary data came
from this now illegal source.' 4 Black vigorously opposed the court action
and threatened to retaliate with the passage of legislation to restrict the
jurisdiction of the courts should an injunction be granted.149
The Federal Communications Commission encountered equally se-
vere criticisms of illegal invasion of personal rights by giving Black copies
of all telegrams he requested under the general supervisory powers to
inspect all telegraph company records. The Democratic Senate ordered
an investigation and found the charge to be untrue. 50 On March 12,
144 George Soule, Liberty League, 88 Naw RuBLic, Aug. 26, 1936, at 66-67; N.Y.
Times, Mar. 20, 1936, at S.
145 Soule, supra note 144, at 95.
146 N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1936; Id., Apr. 5, 1936, at 8.
147 Id., Mar. 3,1936, at 7.
14 8 Id., Mar. 5, 1936, at S.
149 Id., Mar. 6, 1936, at 1.
1650 Id., Mar. 11, 1936, at 1; Id., Mar. 5, 1936, at S.
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1936, Justice Alfred A. Wheat of the District of Columbia Supreme Court
issued a temporary injunction, later made permanent, in which he sub-
stantially agreed with Strawn's views. The injunction barred the Western
Union from turning Strawn's telegrams over to Black.15'
The Black Committee was once again the target of vast public criti-
cism. Senator Steiwer of Oregon denounced Black's so-called totalitarian
use of the powers of the state, comparing it to the methods of the OGPU,
the terrorist secret police.'52 "Invasion of private rights," "Nazi methods,"
and "boiling oil and melted lead" were typical of the rhetoric used to
castigate Black.'53 Black vigorously defended his controversial activities
in a Senate speech. He quoted a remark by Senator Reed, who, although a
critic now, had once had a fair different view when he himself was an in-
vestigator. "It is utterly useless to hide behind the old dodge that every
lawyer has worked, saying, 'Put your finger on the paper you want, and
we will perhaps produce that paper.' """ Black reminded his colleagues
that Senator Wheeler of Montana and Senator Walsch, also of Montana,
incurred the same sort of criticism during the investigation of Mr. Fall
and Attorney General Daugherty in the Teapot Dome scandals. Here
Black quoted from a New York Herald-Tribune editorial describing that
investigation as "good clowning."' 55 That committee had used the sub-
poena power even more extensively, yet the Supreme Court had sustained
such use. 5 6
Several legal authorities considered that Black's investigation of
lobbying was "unquestionably within the powers of the Senate."' The
assumption that the fourth amendment imposed the same limitations on
Congress as it does on law enforcement agencies, the editors of the Colum-
bia Law Review termed "unwarranted."' 58 Furthermore, the only existing
legal restriction, that of valid legislative purpose, does not apply, because
Black himself, by introducing a bill to regulate lobbying, met this possible
objection. And yet, because of the political atmosphere of an election year,
the second phase could not shake this partisan stigma.
The only other dispute over Black's use of the subpoena power that
ever reached the courts involved William Randolph Hearst, "the sage of
151 Id., Mar. 12, 1936, at 1.
152 Id., Mar. 10, 1936, at 1.
153 Id., Mar. 11, 1936, at 18; T"in., Mar. 16, 1936, at 18; COMM cIAL AD FINANCIAL
CHR NicLE, Mar. 14, 1936, at 1704.
154 80 CONG. REc. 4100 (1936).
1'5 Id. at 4101.
356 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
157 Note, The Power of Congressional Investigating Committee to Issue Subpoena Duces
Tecuin, 45 YALE L.J. 1503, 1505 (1936).
i58 36 COLum. L. REv. 841,842 (1936).
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San Simeon," as Senator Minto referred to him. Hearst, not one to neglect
a chance for publicity, seized the opportunity when he heard of the Strawn
case. Hearst's case was somewhat different. The fishing expedition epithet
was irrelevant here. Hearst sought to enjoin Western Union from deliver-
ing one specific telegram to Black. He later amended his petition to ask
return of all other telegrams already in Black's possession. Hearst's at-
torney, Elisha Hanson, based his case in part on first amendment grounds,
arguing that Black had interfered with freedom of the press.159
Crampton Harris, Black's former law partner, defended the Com-
mittee in this case as in the other one. The essence of his defense was that
the courts had no power to enjoin a coordinate branch of the government
from performing its duties as it saw fit. Hearst lost his case, Justice Wheat
ruling that freedom of the press meant the right to criticize the government.
First, no such question arose in this case. Second, the subpoena was suf-
ficiently specific, unlike the Strawn case. Third, the courts had no authority
to enjoin a Senate committee. 60 In a later appeal, it was held that Hearst
might have been able to obtain relief if he had filed earlier. The courts'
jurisdiction did not reach into the Senate.
Neither Hearst nor Black limited their battle to the courts. Roosevelt
responded to Hearst's continual attacks at a press conference, where in
response to an inquiry about censorship in his Administration, Roosevelt
replied, "Preposterous! The correspondent must have read that in a
Hearst paper." 6 Black further retaliated by releasing to Representative
John McSwain of South Carolina, chairman of the House Committee on
Military Affairs, a Hearst telegram instructing his editorial writer to pub-
lish an editorial urging the impeachment of McSwain, describing him as
a Communist in spirit and a traitor in effect. McSwain then denounced
Hearst in a speech before the House. The House reacted to Hearst's silly
accusation of McSwain by roaring with laughter.' Hearst also got his
share of abuse in the Senate. Senator Schwellenbach reviewed Hearst's
record of securing newsworthy documents by theft, of his bribing a tele-
graph operator to steal news releases. The wire service sued Hearst and
won. In the economic realm, Hearst's three 10 per cent reductions in his
employees' wages were criticized by Black's close friend from Indiana.
Hearst, it was noted, failed to cut his own $500,000 salary."
Schwellenbach's attack on Hearst, while vitriolic, was essentially true
159 N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1936, at 6; Id., Mar. 14, 1936, at 5; Id., Mar. 15, 1936, at 20.
160 Id., Mar. 27, 1936, at 6; Id., Apr. 9,1936, at 18.
161 Lobbies: Battle of the Subpoenas Lands a Bomb in Publisher's Lap, 7 NEwswx,
Mar. 28, 1936, at 11.
162 N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1936, at 1, col. 2.
163 Id., Apr. 2, 1936, at 13, col. 1; Id., Apr. 1, 1936, at 11, col. 1.
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and certainly the equivalent of what Hearst's papers were saying every day
about Black and his committee. One is hard-pressed to call this an abuse
of the privilege of congressional immunity. Black's friends argued that
Hearst, protected by his wealth and newspaper ownership, was no inno-
cent victim of headline-conscious senators. Frankly, it would be difficult to
imagine that Hearst was being seriously hurt by the bad publicity.
Whether justified or not, Black's investigation, in part because of its
effectiveness, made powerful enemies. The House rejection of a special
appropriations resolution Black sponsored bears this out. The defeat of
this resolution, by a vote of 153-137, came after argument formally based
almost entirely on the point that Congress should not make an exception
to a general law for the needs of one committee."x 4 In reality, the opposition
arose because of Black's prior conflicts with individual congressmen.
Sparring over the custody of Hopson, the suspicion of bribery thrown on
Representative Patton, and the uncovering of the close relationship of
several congressmen to the utility lobbyists coalesced the various oppo-
nents of Black.' 65 Although the investigation continued into 1938 under the
chairmanship of Senator Minton (Black was appointed to the Supreme
Court in August, 1937), few hearings were held after April, 1936. There-
fore, this point is appropriate to end the discussion of the Black investiga-
tion and evaluate its results.
Without question, Black's investigation was, as has been argued, a
"model of thorough and courageous application"' 0 and "unearthed a rich
store of carefully concealed fact and circumstance."'1 7 Several factors
accounted for the success of Black as an investigator. First, he diligently
prepared in advance. By questioning on the basis of prior knowledge, ob-
tained by thorough reading of letters, memoranda, and other documents,
Black was able to get to the central issue immediately. 08 Second, Black's
firmness in compelling hostile witnesses to testify, by forbidding evasion,
introduction of irrelevant items, or speech-making, pointed the investiga-
tion toward the gathering of facts rather than a forum for pro and con
debate.0 9 At the same time, these procedures resulted in an unfavorable
164 7 NEWSWEEK, Apr. 25,1936, at 13.
165 N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1936, at 9, col. 1.
166 K. Sc aciEsSER, THE LOBByiSTS 69 (1951).
167 WrnjTAs, supra note 12, at 60.
108 Lobby-Inqviry Recoil Disconcerts Administration, 120 LITERARY DIGEST, Aug. 10,
1935, at 4; Lane, supra note 136, at A1207.
169 FRmiK, supra note 7, at 86-87.
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public reaction which lessened the effectiveness of the investigation in
forming public opinion.' 70
The major contribution of the Black Committee was made in the first
phase when the relationship between the legislative objective of the Public
Utilities Holding Company Act and Black's intensive probing was clear.
However, the second phase is more difficult to defend on grounds of legisla-
tive rather than political purpose, especially in an election year when only
anti-New Deal forces were really investigated.
Two prominent philosophical attitudes toward congressional inquiries
exist. One emphasizes protection of individual rights, the other the pro-
tection of Congress' power to investigate. Neither attitude is inherently
liberal or conservative nor partisanly Democratic or Republican. Indeed,
the position taken has often depended on the particular circumstances. In
1935 the Wall Street Journal argued that "... people just can't persuade
themselves that they can get along without law or that a Senate committee
is a substitute for the courts." '171 In 1947 the Journal stated, ". .. to say
that the public has no ... right to inquire.., to learn the facts is to say
something quite foolish."172 The liberal journals in 1935 took a different
stand from today's. The Nation remarked that "as usual in business ap-
peals to the Bill of Rights, liberty is being invoked in order to protect en-
trenched privilege."'173 The American Civil Liberties Union alone can claim
consistency, arguing in 1936, as today, that their duty is to defend civil
rights, not to "... examine the philosophies of those whose fights are
violated." 74 The crux of the matter lies in Alfred Junz' statement, ...... the
real limits of the powers of the members of the Congress lie in the positive
political morality of the nation ." 75 It has proven hopeless, a futile task,
to seek to restrict Congress by an infinity of specific regulations. The basic
constitutional safeguards provide a framework, but history has demon-
strated that the nation can best insure fair play of the committee hearings
by electing fair and honest men of reasoned judgment to Congress-men of
the caliber of Hugo Black.
Upon occasion, especially in the use of tax returns and telegrams,
Senator Black's conduct is troublesome and difficult to reconcile with the
ideals of Justice Black. However, we must resist the temptation to write
our story backwards, to apply the standards that Black ultimately helped
170 Lane, supra note 136, at A1207.
171 Mavrinac, Congressional Investigations, 3 CONFLUECE 463, 475 (1954).
172 Id. at 475.
173 Id. at 470.
174 N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1936, at 15, col. 2.
175 Junz, Congressional Investigating Committees, 21 SoCIAL REARCH 379, 380 (1954).
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to create to the circumstances which, no doubt, influenced their creation.
One of the commonplaces in any study of Black is the recognition that by
modern senatorial confirmation standards, a former Klansman would be
unlikely to reach the High Court. Furthermore, the theme of Platonic cure
of soul dominates the debate on at least one important aspect of Black's
philosophy. Until quite recently we have not demanded of potential justices
a long-established Arthurian purity. And, quite frankly, such is not likely
to be the pedigree of a red-clay Alabama politician with a reputation for
battling the establishment., 6
Perhaps it is too easy to rationalize that Black's ideas and ideals
emerged only after his elevation to the Court. It is no doubt true that his
philosophy developed more fully during his many years on the bench. How-
ever, one can understand Black's personal concepts and practices of sena-
torial investigation by concentrating on his fairness in substance and by
further remembering that Black, the New Dealer, was attacking the powers
of corporate trusts rather than investigating individual citizens. When one
sees, as Black no doubt did, real dangers in concentration of immense
wealth, and the corresponding accumulation of political power which is
drawn like a magnet to it, then Black's investigation may be seen as neces-
sary self-defense on the part of the Senate, fighting to escape the tentacles
of a dishonest, openly corrupt power trust.
New Dealers continue to regard Black's investigation as absolutely
essential and extremely fair. In recalling the battle for the Public Utility
Holding Company Act, William 0. Douglas concluded, "I often thought
that the real driving force behind this legislation was Hugo Black who...
used the Congressional hearing as it had never been used before, making it
an instrument to achieve reform." Douglas defends Black's role as follows:
He pursued financial chicanery, helped to quicken the conscience of America
and to mold public opinion to the need for reforms. He expended an inten-
sity of effort seldom seen.
Black dug deep for facts and was as relentless as a terrier pursuing a
17 6 Meador, Mr. Justice Black: A Tribute, 57 VA. L. Rav. 1109, 1111 (1971). Professor
Meador's discussion of the roots of Black's ideas seems especially appropriate. "Hugo Black's
attitudes were significantly shaped in the tag end of the nineteenth century and the early years
of the twentieth when he was growing to maturity in the Alabama outback and beginning the
practice of law amidst the raw and still new industrialism of Birmingham. His roots lay in the
'other South' of that period, the South of the hill country, the South of industrial labor; he did
not come out of the 'old South' or the cotton South. In background, in his time and region, he
was outside the establishment, to use a currently overworked word. He remained to an extent
spiritually outside of the national establishment all his life, though formally a part of it as a
Supreme Court Justice. Today those who think there is something new about challenging that
establishment could learn much from the career of Hugo Black, who as politician, legislator, and
finally judge was at the business in the days of the grandfathers of many now living."
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rat. He was charged with being unfair, but he never trafficked in innuendos
and slurs, as did some Senate and House investigators who followed him.
His standards were high, as they always had been.... Hugo Black never
tried to destroy a man or woman, only ideas. And through his investigative
committees he exposed ideas that he thought were hostile to democratic
principles. It was largely Black who made possible FDR's reforms in the
financial world.17
But one still wishes and wonders and tries, at least in the mind's eye,
to make Senator Black into Justice Black. Perhaps our great heroes of the
law do cast shadows backward, as well as forward, especially when we
know the story's ending. And yet, the ending is but a reflection and develop-
ment of the beginning. Without question, Black knew the power of which
he spoke, and knew from the most real and personal experience the feelings
of the zealous congressional advocate, of the man on the attack who has
smelled blood and is tempted by the "rightness of his cause" to go in for
the kill. Perhaps his own testing by temptation made Black, the judicial
guardian, more aware of the weakness of the flesh and the need for a
strength and a resolve in the protection of the individual against even the
purest of knights in service of the most righteous of causes.
Although Black was the first and, in some respects, the most loyal of
the so-called "New Deal Justices," one must remember, as Douglas notes,
that Black's basic commitments were to ideals-ideals which the New
Deal personified but, nonetheless, ideals which he had held long before
there was anything known as a New Deal and which he would continue to
hold long, long after the Rooseveltian revolution had become history. The
strength, the tenacity, the dedication to purpose which he exemplified in
the days of the senatorial investigations served Black and his ideals well
during his thirty-four years on the bench. "His alive and forceful per-
sonality," as Professor Meador reminded us, "made it difficult to keep in
mind that he had been appointed to the Court in that now remote admin-
istration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, himself dead before most of
today's law students were born.' 78
In the early days of the New Deal, the public utilities holding com-
panies represented to Black a challenge-a challenge which can be under-
stood most clearly in the light of history and of Black's own understanding
of history. Just as Black believed there are recurring themes in the lives
of nations, indeed, in the epochs of civilization, so also are there themes
in the lives of men. And in the life of Hugo Black, one of those themes was
surely the fear of corruption by power, whether that power be the power
177 W. DOUGLAS, Go EAST YOUNG MAN: TnE EARLY YmRs 365-66 (1974).
178 Meador, Mr. Justice Black: A Tribute, 57 VA. L. RIv. 1109 (1971).
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of the dollars of the public utility holding company or the power of the
subpoenas of a congressional investigating committee which Black ulti-
mately came to believe might destroy freedom of speech and association
in a quest to destroy communism.
Black understood, perhaps too well, Lord Acton's oft-quoted dictum
on power and corruption. He had read, and read deeply, in the likes of
Plutarch and Livy. To Black, both the Republican and Democratic party
roles in the corruption of Watergate would have been nothing new-tragic,
but not new.
To know these dangers and to understand the need to continue to
struggle against them is one of the hardest lessons of history. To be able
to do so is the real tribute, the ultimate measure of a man and of his own
role in history. It is reassuring to remember that we may also learn from
the past that just as surely as there are recurring problems, often there are
recurring solutions; there are heroes to match villains, and always, faced
against the usurpers of liberty are the solitary guardians of freedom.
In a very real and meaningful sense, Black's congressional investiga-
tions are a part, to borrow Holmes's phrase, of the seamless web of Black's
life at the law-a life of achievement in which the Supreme Court years are
no doubt important but not exclusive. The sum, in his case, is made all the
greater by the total of its parts. And, thus, Black's entire career can be
favorably measured against the ideal life that Choate described for the
man of law.
To be a priest, and possibly a high priest in the Temple of Justice; to
serve at her altar and aid in her administration; to maintain and defend the
inalienable rights of life, liberty and property upon which the safety of
society depends; to succor the oppressed and defend the innocent; to main-
tain constitutional rights against all violations, whether executive, by the
legislature, by the restless power of the press, or most of all by the ruthless
rapacity of an unbridled majority; to rescue the scapegoat and restore him
to his proper place in the world-all this seems to me to furnish a field
worthy of any man's ambitions.1 79
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